Liked the post, I have been making similar arguments! The difference between pro-Russian sentiment and secession is shown in International Republican Institute and Pew polls of 2014, both made after the Maidan revolution. In the east, a majority wanted to join the Russian customs union, have Russian as a joint official language and have a positive attitude towards Russia. However, allowing regions to secede from Ukraine polled 18% in the east.
I disagree with the idea that you can infer a shift in public opinion based on Zelensky's support in the election. He campaigned for negotiations with the Russian government, presumably this means allowing for some autonomy in Donbas. A slight majority wants to either succeed or become an autonomous republican inside a Ukrainian state, according to research by Ivan Katchanovski.
How would you go about learning about preferences and voting behaviour in Ukraine today? Many KIIS polls on separatism appear to be sampling on the dependent variable by not surveying separatist or Russian-controlled areas. Further, does the threat of violence from both sides make honest answers hard to obtain?
Perhaps a better way of putting it is that Ukrainian democracy matured to the point where in 2019 a presidential candidate could carry districts in both Kharkiv and Volyn oblasts in the first round in a crowded field of choices. You're absolutely right that Zelensky's relative dovishness compared to Poroshenko tapped into a middle ground that had not really been credibly staked out until that point.
The main problem with autonomy, federalization, etc., isn't so much that it's a horrible idea in theory but that, as far as the Minsk protocols are concerned, Putin would never have allowed a deal to go through that didn't grant the D/LNR (and by extension the Kremlin) veto power over Ukrainian foreign policy. I am doubtful that was ever the real kitchen table issue in the Donbas that people there would like to raise with Kyiv.
Agree! That fact puts an upper bound on the level of balkanization in Ukrainian politics that people like Musk can claim. However, I do still believe that these polls show clear variation between regions in opinions about everything from the legitimacy of the Maidan revolution to views on Russia. I don't know how to convincingly show that the pattern persists after 2014 but feels reasonable that it would.
That strikes me as a feature and not a bug. A foreign policy veto would be a commitment device for not joining NATO which the member states can't credibly give. But I take your point that it would compromise the sovereignty of Ukraine.
A useful essay. I hadn't seen the 2019 first round map before. It shows, though, that the Donbass *was* opposition territory. That's not Zap-Cher, but it's important.
My unscientific survey in the Donbas during my visit in May (interviews conducted in Kramatorsk, Sviatohirsk, Bakhmut, Siversk, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and random villages in between) was that people who were pro-Russia before now feel ambivalent, while people who were ambivalent before are now pro-Ukraine. As per my second point in my essay, just because someone wants good relations with Russia doesn't mean they wanted any of this. Frankly, many of them pine for the return of the Soviet Union as it existed in 1980 or so, along with their youthful virality. When they realize that the Russian Federation can't deliver that, they second guess a lot.
Liked the post, I have been making similar arguments! The difference between pro-Russian sentiment and secession is shown in International Republican Institute and Pew polls of 2014, both made after the Maidan revolution. In the east, a majority wanted to join the Russian customs union, have Russian as a joint official language and have a positive attitude towards Russia. However, allowing regions to secede from Ukraine polled 18% in the east.
I disagree with the idea that you can infer a shift in public opinion based on Zelensky's support in the election. He campaigned for negotiations with the Russian government, presumably this means allowing for some autonomy in Donbas. A slight majority wants to either succeed or become an autonomous republican inside a Ukrainian state, according to research by Ivan Katchanovski.
How would you go about learning about preferences and voting behaviour in Ukraine today? Many KIIS polls on separatism appear to be sampling on the dependent variable by not surveying separatist or Russian-controlled areas. Further, does the threat of violence from both sides make honest answers hard to obtain?
https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/iri.org/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukraine,%20March%2014-26,%202014.pdf
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/05/08/chapter-1-ukraine-desire-for-unity-amid-worries-about-political-leadership-ethnic-conflict/
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23745118.2016.1154131?journalCode=rpep21
Perhaps a better way of putting it is that Ukrainian democracy matured to the point where in 2019 a presidential candidate could carry districts in both Kharkiv and Volyn oblasts in the first round in a crowded field of choices. You're absolutely right that Zelensky's relative dovishness compared to Poroshenko tapped into a middle ground that had not really been credibly staked out until that point.
The main problem with autonomy, federalization, etc., isn't so much that it's a horrible idea in theory but that, as far as the Minsk protocols are concerned, Putin would never have allowed a deal to go through that didn't grant the D/LNR (and by extension the Kremlin) veto power over Ukrainian foreign policy. I am doubtful that was ever the real kitchen table issue in the Donbas that people there would like to raise with Kyiv.
Agree! That fact puts an upper bound on the level of balkanization in Ukrainian politics that people like Musk can claim. However, I do still believe that these polls show clear variation between regions in opinions about everything from the legitimacy of the Maidan revolution to views on Russia. I don't know how to convincingly show that the pattern persists after 2014 but feels reasonable that it would.
That strikes me as a feature and not a bug. A foreign policy veto would be a commitment device for not joining NATO which the member states can't credibly give. But I take your point that it would compromise the sovereignty of Ukraine.
A useful essay. I hadn't seen the 2019 first round map before. It shows, though, that the Donbass *was* opposition territory. That's not Zap-Cher, but it's important.
My own thoughts are at:
https://ericrasmusen.substack.com/p/good-and-bad-reasons-why-the-united
I support Ukrainia, but for other reasons.
My unscientific survey in the Donbas during my visit in May (interviews conducted in Kramatorsk, Sviatohirsk, Bakhmut, Siversk, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and random villages in between) was that people who were pro-Russia before now feel ambivalent, while people who were ambivalent before are now pro-Ukraine. As per my second point in my essay, just because someone wants good relations with Russia doesn't mean they wanted any of this. Frankly, many of them pine for the return of the Soviet Union as it existed in 1980 or so, along with their youthful virality. When they realize that the Russian Federation can't deliver that, they second guess a lot.